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THE NEW MARYLAND CLOSE CORPORATION LAW
By WILLIAM G. HALL, JR.*
The new Maryland Close Corporation statute,' which became effec-
tive in June, 1967, represents one of the most significant steps toward
special recognition and treatment of the close corporation yet taken by
any state. Developed by the Commission on the Revision of the Corpo-
ration Laws of Maryland, the Close Corporation subtitle was among
the changes to the corporation law recommended by the Commission
to the General Assembly at its 1967 Session.2 It is the purpose of this
article to analyze in some detail the theoretical background and ex-
pected operation of the new subtitle as an aid to its understanding
and interpretation.'
Generally, lawyers think of such a corporation as a small busi-
ness, often as a partnership operating in corporate form. More specific-
ally, they would probably consider it to be a corporation having such
characteristics as a limited number of stockholders, relatively small
capital and earnings, stockholders actively participating in the busi-
ness, no established market for the corporation's stock, and a close
personal relationship among the stockholders. 4 At the threshold of
any attempt to develop statutory regulation of the close corporation
is the problem of producing a workable statutory description of it.
The new Maryland law in effect defines the close corporation as one
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland; B.A., 1952, Washington
& Lee University; LL.B., 1955; LL.M., 1963, Harvard Law School; Member of the
Commission on Revision of the Corporation Laws of Maryland.
1. MD. CODi. ANN. art. 23, §§ 100-11 (Supp. 1967). Sections of the Close
Corporation subtitle will hereafter be referred to only by section number.
2. This Commission, appointed by the Governor in 1965 in response to a Joint
Resolution of the General Assembly of that year, was charged with the study and
revision of the corporation law with particular attention to certain designated problems,
one of which was the development of special treatment for the close or small corpora-
tion. For the complete statutory revision recommended by the Commission, see
Commission on Revision of the Corp. Laws of Md., Final Report, (Dec. 15, 1966).
Slight changes in the recommendations contained in this report were made prior to
enactment.
3. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of its author and do not
purport to represent the position or opinion of the Commission or its members.
4. For general consideration of the characteristics of the close corporation see
F.H. O'NnAL, CLOS9 CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAC'TICZ § 1.07 (1958); Kramer,
Foreword to Symposium Issue on "The Close Corporation," 18 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 433 (1953) ; Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28
CORNmLL L.Q. 313, 314 (1943).
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in which the stock is subject to certain specified transfer restrictions
and which has elected close corporation status by unanimous vote
of its stockholders.
As an introduction to the new law and before entering upon a
section by section analysis of the Subtitle, it will be helpful to summarize
briefly the benefits and restrictions resulting from the election of close
corporation status. Easily the most important of these benefits is the
power to regulate the affairs of the corporation and the relationships
of the stockholders directly by contractual agreement.5 In the vast
majority of "incorporated partnerships," such matters as division of
profits, the voice to be given each owner in corporate decisions, em-
ployment rights, etc., are the subject of negotiated agreement among
the parties prior to incorporation. Often, however, the lawyer finds
it difficult to fit these individualized agreements into the standard cor-
porate pattern. In some instances the parties' objectives can be ac-
complished only by a skilled corporate specialist and then only by the
use of complex and cumbersome devices. The stockholders' agreement
obviates the need for such devices, making it possible for any lawyer
capable of drawing a contractual agreement to accomplish his clients'
ends simply and directly.
The provisions making judicial dissolution more readily available
to the close corporation also represent a better accommodation of the
law to the special needs and character of the small business. Finally,
the new law eliminates or relaxes certain formalities and standard
procedures which are unnecessary in the case of the small corporation.
A close corporation is permitted under the statute, for example, to
elect to operate with less than the usual minimum of three directors or
to eliminate the board of directors altogether in favor of direct stock-
holder action. Unless specifically requested by a stockholder, the close
corporation is relieved of the necessity of holding an annual stock-
holders' meeting, and in contrast to present provisions limiting stock-
holders' inspection of corporate books and records, stockholders of the
close corporation are given access to all records.
These advantages of close corporation status are available to any
corporation willing to accept a general restriction upon the transfera-
bility of its stock, a cost which is not unduly high in view of the fact
that in virtually every case in which the special benefits are appropriate,
sound corporate planning dictates the use of stock transfer restrictions
and a stock purchase agreement. Upon an election of close corporation
status the transfer of the corporation's stock is automatically restricted
by the statute, the shares being transferable only if the proposed transfer
is either (1) permitted under a stock purchase agreement embodied in a
stockholders' agreement, or (2) unanimously approved by the stock-
holders at the time of the transfer. A stockholder wishing to make a
transfer not covered by a stockholders' agreement and for which he can-
not obtain stockholder consent is given the right to liquidate his invest-
5. Although the general validity of stockholders' agreements was established by
the decision in DeBoy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955), uncertainty as
to the extent of validation has resulted in lawyers being reluctant to rely on such
agreements to any great extent in planning small corporations.
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ment by forcing either dissolution of the corporation or purchase of
his interest by the remaining stockholders. The procedure under which
this right is asserted is relatively simple. After a request for unanimous
approval of a proposed transfer has been rejected, a stockholder may
petition for a judicial order of dissolution. Other stockholders wishing
to continue the business may block the dissolution by electing to pur-
chase the petitioner's stock. If such election is made and the parties
are unable to agree upon the purchase price to be paid for the stock,
the purchasing stockholders may request the court to appoint appraisers
to determine the purchase price in the same manner in which the value
of stock is determined upon the assertion of the stockholder's appraisal
right under Section 73.1 After approval of the price to be paid, the
court is given considerable latitude in establishing appropriate con-
ditions of sale, including the power to order payment of the purchase
price in installments. This broad grant of authority is designed to en-
able the court to best and most fairly adjust the competing interests
of the parties in light of the facts of each case. As a practical matter,
most cases can be expected to be settled on an informal basis without
resort to this procedure, the threat of court action providing a strong
stimulus to informal settlement.
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
Although special statutory treatment for the close corporation has
been urged for a number of years,7 practical efforts in this direction
have been largely stymied by the key problem of defining these cor-
porations. It was the solution of this problem which opened the way
for the substantial progress represented by the new Maryland statute.
Lawyers, of course, understand each other when they speak in-
formally of a close corporation, having in mind the general character-
istics enumerated earlier. But informal use of the term is one thing
and drafting a workable statutory definition of it is quite a different
matter. The New York Law Revision Commission, for example, con-
sidered the feasibility of a close corporation statute in 1947 but aban-
doned the project because it could produce no satisfactory definition.8
In 1955 North Carolina enacted the first statutory definition of a
close corporation,9 providing that such a corporation is one in which
the shares are not "generally traded in the markets maintained by
6. MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, § 73 (1966 repl. vol.).
7. See, e.g., Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. Rv. 432 (1956); Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern
Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 305 (1937) ;Winer, Proposing a New York
"Close Corporation Law," 28 CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1943) ; Note, A Plea for Separate
Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 700 (1958).
8. 1948 Report of the New York Law Revision Comm'n, at 385.
9. The term "close corporation" does not appear in the North Carolina statute,
but the description was understood by its draftsmen and by later commentators to be
that of a close corporation. See, e.g., F.H. O'NtAL, CLOSE COR'ORATIONS: LAW AND
PRACT Ic § 1.14 (1958); Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation - The
Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 Gzo. L.J. 1145, 1146 (1966); Latty,
The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34
N.C.L. Rrv. 432, 438 (1956).
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securities dealers or brokers."'" This definition was subsequently
adopted in the South Carolina," Florida,12 and New York 3 statutory
sections providing limited close corporation treatment. The difficulty
with the "not generally traded" definition lies in its uncertainty. At
times lawyers would, of course, find it difficult to advise clients as to
whether there have been sufficient sales of stock to constitute general
trading. But this difficulty is not insuperable. Much more serious is
the fact that the loss of close corporation status due to sales of stock
may result in the serious question being raised' as to the continued
validity of any outstanding stockholders' agreement.' 4 The clear valida-
tion of the stockholders' agreement is the most important contribution
of a close corporation statute, and a threat to the validity of such agree-
ments not only impairs their effectiveness, but seriously discourages
their use. Consider for a moment the investor in a small corporation
who has secured the agreement of the other parties that he is to be
given a place on the board of directors, regardless of his voting power.
His lawyer under normal corporation law could assure him of this
agreement ithrough cumulative voting or classification of the stock.
Of course, rather cumbersome provisions would be necessary to pro-
tect these devices against change or circumvention, but the end result
could be relied upon with reasonable confidence. It seems unlikely
that a lawyer would be willing to substitute a stockholders' agree-
ment for one of these familiar arrangements if there were danger
that such an agreement could be thrown into question by future
trading in the stock. True, stock transfer restrictions could avoid this
danger, but if such restrictions will always be a practical necessity,
the approach of the new Maryland statute seems preferable. This ap-
proach accepts the practical need for stock transfer restrictions in the
close corporation and makes that fact the crux of its definition. Once
effective restrictions upon transfers of stock are imposed, general
trading in the stock is impossible. Under the Maryland approach,
stockholders' agreements cannot be thrown into question since the
statute invalidates improper transfers of stock rather than the close
corporation status itself.
Definition of the close corporation in terms of a maximum number
of stockholders was considered by the Commission as a possible alterna-
tive to the North Carolina approaoh .' 5 Theoretical objection has been
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-73(b) (1965).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-16.22(c) (Supp. 1966).
12. FLA. STAT. § 608.0100(2) (1963).
13. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 620(c) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
14. In view of § 104(e) and DeBoy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903(1955), the loss of close corporation status might well be held to have no affect upon
an outstanding stockholders' agreement, but until further decisions amplify the DeBoy
case the matter remains in doubt.
15. Such an approach has frequently been suggested. See, e.g., Bradley, Toward
4 More Perfect Close Corporation - The Need for More and Improved Legislation,
28 CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1943). This approach has recently been incorporated as one of
the qualification requirements under the new Delaware close corporation statute.
DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 342 (2 P-H CoR'ORATIO N 1967).
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made to numerical definition on the ground that any number which is
selected would be arbitrary and without genuine and substantial rela-
tionship to the purpose of the limitation.' While this is true, more
practical problems are involved. Here, even more than in the case of the
"not generally traded" definition, there is serious danger of the validity
of an outstanding stockholders' agreement being called into question,
since, for any one of a variety of reasons, the number of stockholders
may increase past the permitted maximum causing loss of close corpora-
tion status. Here, as there, the only practical protection is a compre-
hensive restriction upon the transferability of the stock. When such
restriction is imposed by the statute itself, as under the new Maryland
law, further requirements, such as a limit on the number of stockholders,
become unnecessary. In addition to the problem of loss of close cor-
poration status, definition in numerical terms creates the difficulty of
determining who is to be counted as a stockholder. If the numerical
limitation is to be applied to stockholders of record, are trusts, corpo-
rations, estates, and other representatives to be counted as a single
stockholder? If so, the numerical limitation becomes almost meaning-
less because of the ease of circumvention. On the other hand, the dis-
qualification of trusts, corporations, and other representatives as stock-
holders of the close corporation would seriously limit its usefulness."
If, to avoid this dilemma, the numerical limit is applied to holders of
beneficial interests, even more difficult questions arise. For example,
would all beneficial interests be included, however remote or contingent?
If not, which of these are to be counted? Unless transfers of interests
in the stock were closely restricted, one could never be certain that a
trust or other instrument creating future interests had not invalidated
the qualification as a close corporation.
In spite of these problems, numerical definitions have been used
in certain special contexts. Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code'
limits to ten the number of stockholders of a small business corporation,
the stockholders of which may elect to be taxed upon corporate income
substantially as individuals in lieu of the applicable corporate tax. The
problem of who is to be counted as a stockholder is resolved by speci-
fying that stockholders must be individuals. As pointed out, however,
this could be done in the case of a close corporation statute only at the
cost of seriously limiting its usefulness, a cost which seems unwar-
ranted if there is an acceptable alternative. More importantly, the
possible invalidation of a governing stockholders' agreement as a result
16. See, e.g., Comment, New York Statute Gives Special Treatment to Close
Corporations, 75 HARv. L. REv. 852, 854 (1962); Comment, Definition of the CloseCorporation, 16 VAND. L. &ev. 1267, 1269 (1963).17. The close corporation has attractive possibilities for use by other corporations
as a simplified method of operating a wholly owned subsidiary or as a vehicle for ajoint venture to which the corporation will be a party. Although primary emphasisin close corporation reform is placed upon the usefulness of the device to the smallbusinessman, other legitimate uses should not be ignored. The new Delaware close
corporation law presumably excludes corporations and trusts having corporate trustees
as stockholders of a close corporation by the use of the word "persons" in §342(a) (1), while allowing trusts in which the trustees are individuals. DEL. GSN.
CoRP. LAW § 342(a) (1) (2 P-H CoRPORATIoN 1967).
18. INT. Rgv. COD of 1954, § 1371(a).
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of the loss of close corporation status has, in most instances, much more
serious implications than loss of the benefits of Subchapter S.1
The British and Puerto Rican corporation statutes furnish further
examples of the use of a numerical limitation to define the small cor-
poration for special purposes. The British private company, which is
defined in part as a corporation having no more than fifty stock-
holders,2" is exempt from certain informational reporting required of
corporations under the British equivalent of the Securities Exchange
Act. The Puerto Rican statute provides that corporations having no
more than eleven stockholders may elect to operate without a board
of directors.21 In both of these statutes, as in the case of Subchapter S,
the loss of the affirmative benefits of the statute is substantially less
serious than possible invalidation of the stockholders' agreement.
In summary, the purpose of a statutory definition of a close cor-
poration is not to set forth an accurate general definition of the term,
but rather to differentiate between corporations for which the particular
benefits being provided in the statute are appropriate and corporations
for which those benefits are not appropriate. 21 If feasible, it would
have been desirable to extend the benefits of the new Subtitle to all
corporations on the ground that the burden of formalities and re-
strictions imposed on businessmen should be reduced wherever pos-
sible. A consideration of each of the benefits established by the Subtitle
will indicate that in every case the reason for not extending the bene-
fit to certain corporations relates to the fact that the stock of those
companies can be readily traded resulting in (1) purchase of stock
by inactive stockholders who are vulnerable to abuses by insiders or
active owners, or (2) purchase of stock under conditions which do not
provide strong practical assurance that the purchaser will be made
aware of the corporation's status as a close corporation and of any
governing stockholders' agreement.23 Under the new Maryland statute,
those corporations having stock transfer restrictions which effectively
eliminate general trading of the stock may take advantage of the statu-
tory benefits. Thus the ground of distinction between corporations for
19. Loss of such close corporation benefits as the right to operate without directors
or the elimination of the requirement of a stockholders' annual meeting is more nearly
analogous to the loss of Subchapter S benefits.
20. The British private company is a corporation which (1) limits to fifty its
membership, (2) restricts the right to transfer shares and (3) prohibits invitation tothe public to participate. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 28.
21. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14, § 1102(c) (1962).
22. "The close corporation is not a particular business form, but rather ageneric name for corporations which should be exempted from certain corporate
norms, and it should be defined in terms of the particular characteristic which justifies
the exemption." Note, Statutory Assistance for Closely Held Corporations, 71 HARV.L. Rev. 1498 (1958). The Note presents an interesting development of this generalidea although differing from the Maryland statutory draftsmen in its ultimate con-
clusion. Any attempt to develop a close corporation statute involves a "chicken and
egg" dilemma in that the way that a close corporation is defined depends upon the
consequences which are to be attached to the definition, and the consequences which
are attached to the definition depend on the way in which the term is defined.23. In the case of validation of stockholders' agreements the statute expresses thelimited decision that such validation is clearly appropriate in the case of a corporation
electing statutory close corporation status. The question of the appropriateness of
such agreements for other corporations is expressly left to future judicial determina-
tion under § 104(e).
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which the benefits are appropriate and those for which they are not is
closely tailored to the reasons underlying the need for the distinction. In
addition, the danger that governing stockholders' agreements may be
thrown into question is avoided since the statute invalidates prohibited
transfers of stock rather than the close corporation status itself.
THE STATUTE
Election of Close Corporation Status - Section 100.
Under the provisions of Section 100 close corporation status is
acquired by placing in the charter of the corporation a statement that
it is a close corporation, and such status continues so long as the state-
ment remains in the charter. Both the inclusion of this statement in
the charter and its removal require unanimous stockholder consent.
Election of close corporation status is required to be unanimous because
it results in a basic change in the nature of the corporation. The
requirement that termination of the status also be unanimous is neces-
sary to protect minority stockholders relying upon a stockholders' agree-
ment to secure bargained-for rights. It does this by giving them a
veto over an action which might call into question the continued validity
of that agreement.
Clear reference to the fact that the corporation is a close corporation
is required by Section 100(c) on stock certificates and at the head of all
charter documents. 4 The Subsection expressly states, however, that
compliance with these requirements is not a prerequisite to acquisition of
the close corporation status. Although the requirement of Section 100 (c)
may appear ineffectual in the absence of statutory sanctions for failure to
comply with it, the alternative of making close corporation qualifica-
tion turn upon the existence of reference to the status on stock certifi-
cates or the clarity of the charter reference would create a trap for the
unwary with quite serious consequences. On balance, the risk of non-
compliance seems the lesser evil.25
Restrictions on Transfer of Stock - Section 101.
As has been pointed out, the new statute makes the election of
close corporation status an automatic election to restrict transfer of
24. The distinction should be noted between this provision requiring clarity of the
charter reference and the requirements of § 100(a) that the charter state that
the corporation is a close corporation. While cloa corporation qualification depends
upon the existence in the charter of the § 100(a) statement, the clear-reference-at-
the-head-of-the-charter requirement of § 100(c) is supplementary and non-compliance
with it has no effect upon qualification as a close corporation. As a practical matter,
of course, a charter document which does not comply with § 100(c) would not be
accepted for filing by the Department if it is aware that the corporation is a
close corporation.
25. Cf. L'Neal, Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 641, 657-58 (1965), where the same conclusion is reached in referenceto an analogous requirement that provisions regulating the management of the cor-poration be contained in the charter or a similar document in order to be valid.Elsewhere in the Maryland Corporation Law sanction or penalty is omitted forfailure to hold the organization meeting required by § 55 of Article 23 or the annual
stockholders' meeting required by § 38(b) of the same Article.
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the corporation's stock to transfers which are specified in a stock-
holders' agreement or those unanimously approved by the stockholders
at the time of the transfer. These transfer restrictions are set forth in
Section 101.
Section 101 (a) (1) authorizes any transfer of stock which has been
unanimously approved by the stockholders within three months prior
to the transfer. This provision provides flexibility for the unforeseen
stiuation and at the same time protection for all of the participants
against an unwanted new "partner."
Section 101 (a) (2) authorizes, in addition, any transfer which
"is made pursuant to a provision of a stockholders' agreement au-
thorized by Section 104 of this subtitle requiring the purchase of
stock by, or the offer of stock to (i) the corporation, or (ii) one or
more of its stockholders or its security holders, or (iii) one or more
persons named in the agreement." It should be carefully noted that
the phrase "requiring purchase of stock by, or the offer of stock to"
apparently does not permit the stockholders' agreement to validate a
transfer by will or inter vivos gift. It would seem also to exclude
approval in the agreement of an offer to sell where there is neither a
requirement that the offer be made nor that it be accepted. Since the
purpose of Section 101 (a) (2) is to provide maximum scope to the
parties to tailor the agreement to their particular needs (consistent
with insuring that the transfer restriction actually operate to exclude
public trading), it would seem necessary that the provisions of this
subsection be broadened to permit a much wider range of transfers. 26
While the agreement may authorize transfers to stockholders or
security holders of the corporation without naming them, all other
transferees must be expressly named.' This latter requirement is de-
signed to prevent the complete elimination of the transfer restriction
through overly broad exemptions in the stockholders' agreement, 28
26. It is suggested that § 101(a) (2) should be amended to read "such trans-
fer is made pursuant to a provision of a stockholders' agreement authorized by§ 104 of this subtitle permitting transfer to (i) the corporation, or (ii) one or
more of its stockholders, its security holders, or the wives, children or grandchildren
of such stockholders or security holders or (iii) one or more persons named in such
agreement" (changes in italics). In addition to the substitution of the words "per-
mitting transfer to" for the words "requiring the purchase of stock by, or offer of
stock to," the suggested amendment would add the words "the wives, children or
grandchildren of such stockholders or security holders." This latter addition would
permit more flexibility in estate planning since the wives, children or grandchildren
of a stockholder or security holder could be designated without the necessity that they
be specifically named. For example, it would allow the stockholders' agreement to
approve a distribution among a stockholders' children living at his death, regardless
of the fact that some of the children were born after the execution of the agreement.
It would also be desirable to permit transfers in trust for the benefit of an ap-
proved transferee.
27. The word "persons" in § 101(a) (2) (iii) is intended to include all named
persons or entities, including corporations, etc.
28. Such a result would seem possible under § 342 of the new Delaware close
-corporation statute: "[A]ll of the issued stock of all classes shall be subject to one
-or more of the restrictions on transfer permitted by section 202 of this title. . ..
-§ 202(e) provides that "Any other lawful restriction on transfer or registration of
transfer of securities is permitted by this section." Dim.. GN. CORP. LAW § 34 2(a) (2)(2 P-H CORPORATION 1967).
[VOL. XXVII
MARYLAND CLOSE CORPORATION LAW
while at the same time providing flexibility to the parties in drafting
the agreement to carry out their special needs.
While it seems fair to say that the planning for virtually every
close corporation should include a stock purchase agreement, it was
necessary to recognize that such an agreement will sometimes be
omitted and that the statute should provide a reasonably workable alter-
native for the corporation in which there is no agreement. Section
101 (b) sets out this alternative. The stockholder who is unable to
make a transfer of stock due to the absence of authorization for the
transfer in a stockholders' agreement and a refusal of unanimous per-
mission for the transfer by the remaining stockholders is given the
right to liquidate his investment by forcing either a dissolution of the
corporation or purchase of his stock by the remaining stockholders.
His right to force dissolution is set forth in Section 101 (b) which
specifies that the dissolution is to be carried out under the procedure
outlined in Section 109. That section establishes the right of stock-
holders wishing to continue the business to prevent dissolution by pur-
chasing the stock of the person seeking the dissolution. As noted
previously, it is likely that as a practical matter, most cases will be
resolved by informally negotiated sales among stockholders rather than
by resort to the formal procedure of Sections 101 (b) and 109.
This right of the close corporation stockholder to liquidate his in-
vestment through dissolution is to a limited extent a reversal of estab-
lished corporate policy.' The right of less than a two-thirds majority of
stockholders to force dissolution has generally been narrowly restricted
on the ground that the interests of those wishing to continue the busi-
ness outweigh the interests of stockholders wishing to terminate it.30
For the publicly held corporation, this general approach is probably
sound. In the great majority of cases involving such corporations the
stockholder or group of stockholders desiring dissolution represents a
relatively small proportion of the ownership. Where a market exists for
the company's stock, dissolution is not necessary to allow the stock-
holder to liquidate his investment since he can do so by sale of his
stock. These considerations, however, have little if any force in the
case of the corporation which is essentially a partnership. As a prac-
tical matter there is seldom a market for the stock of such a corpora-
tion, the result being that a stockholder who is not employed in the
business holds an investment that is all but worthless since he cannot
liquidate it, dividends in such companies being relatively rare. When
there are few stockholders as in the small corporation, the interest of
each will represent a much greater percentage of ownership. Heretofore,
29. The difficulty of obtaining dissolution under established corporate policy is
criticized and arguments for a general relaxation of that policy set forth in Israels,
The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence - Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution,
19 U. CmI. L. Rtv. 779 (1952).
30. See, e.g., MD. CODS ANN. art. 23, § 79A(a),(b) (Supp. 1967) ; N.Y. Bus.
CoRp. LAW. § 1104 (McKinney 1962). For discussion of the generally narrow limits
placed on judicial dissolution, see Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North
Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. Rxv. 432, 447-48 (1956) ; Note, Dissolu-
tion and Minority Shareholder Protection in the Close Corporation, 1966 Wis. L. Rlv.
1232, 1233-34.
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the dissolution policy developed primarily in reference to the publicly
held corporation has also been applied to the incorporated partnership
since there was no practical method of designating the corporations for
which the general rules were inappropriate. Since the new close cor-
poration law provides a means for making this distinction, a reversal of
the traditional policy is both appropriate and desirable in the case of
the small corporation.8 It should be noted that the extent of this change
is carefully limited. The right to dissolution comes into play only in
cases where the transfer is neither provided for in the stockholders'
agreement nor permitted by unanimous stockholder approval. In addi-
tion, the dissolution may be blocked by any stockholder willing to pur-
chase the stock of the shareholder seeking termination. Finally, the
stockholders are given the broad power to entirely eliminate the dis-
solution right in the stockholders' agreement if they consider it
undesirable.
The statute might well have gone further and omitted the require-
ment of a request for, and denial of, stockholder approval of a proposed
transfer as a prerequisite to the right of a stockholder to liquidate his
investment. Such a change would, in effect, have been an adoption
of the basic policy of partnership law that, absent contractual pro-
visions to the contrary, each partner may liquidate his partnership
interest at will. 2 Not only would this have simplified the statutory
scheme, but it would have offered a solution to the common and serious
problem of the stockholder who is frozen into a close corporation
because of the general absence of a market for the stock of such corpora-
tions and the consequent unavailability of the Section 101 (b) remedy.
Other states considering a close corporation approach similar to that of
the new Maryland statute should give careful consideration to this
alternative.
When the dissolution right is limited to cases in which approval
of a transfer has been refused, it must be recognized that a stockholder
desiring to withdraw his investment might well be able to circumvent
the prerequisite with a little imagination. For example, such a stock-
holder might request approval of a transfer to his wife. If the approval
is denied, he has his dissolution right. If it is given, he makes the trans-
fer to her, then both request approval of a further transfer and each
vetoes the other's request thereby setting up the dissolution right. Al-
though this device is stated in bald terms for illustrative purposes, it
would in practice be camouflaged as estate planning or other legitimate
effort and spread over a period of time. As the dissolution petition
must be addressed to an equity court, such circumvention would prob-
ably not be permitted on general equitable principles. However, it was
considered advisable that it be made clear in the statute that the court
should be alert for attempts to evade the statutory purpose and should
deny the petition when such an attempt is found. It was, therefore,
specified in Section 101 (b) that the proposed transfer must be "bona
31. Cf. Note, Dissolution and Minority Shareholder Protection in the Close
Corporation, 1966 Wis. L. Rtv. 1232, 1234.
32. MD. CoDe ANN. art. 73A, §§ 31(1) (b) (2) ; 38(1) (Supp. 1967). Cf. Israels,
supra note 29, at 789.
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fide." It should be emphasized that the use of this term was directed at
the danger of circumvention of the statutory purpose and is not intended
to require a firm or even a tentative offer for the stock to have been
made by a third person before a request for transfer may be properly
made. The requirement of a firm offer as a prerequisite to a request
for stockholder approval of a transfer was specifically considered by the
Commission and rejected as too burdensome. In this same connection,
the purpose of the requirement that the proposed transferees be named
in the request for permission to transfer is simply to inform the remain-
ing stockholders of the identity of any prospective "partner" in order
that they may determine whether he is acceptable and does not indi-
cate a necessity that an offer has actually been made.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the lawyer establishing
a close corporation should not rely on the provisions of Section 101 as
a substitute for a stock purchase agreement. The stock purchase agree-
ment should be made a primary part of the planning for any corporation
electing close corporation status under the new Subtitle, and in the
drafting of this agreement, careful consideration should be given to
the advisability of eliminating the Section 101 (b) right of dissolution
altogether in favor of a comprehensive contractual scheme.
Although the statutory restriction applies generally to all transfers
of stock, Section 101 (c) makes special provision for certain types of
transfers.8 In the case of such legal representatives as executors,
guardians, and trustees in bankruptcy, the effect of the subsection is
simply to substitute them for the original stockholder. During the
period such representative holds the stock, he may exercise voting and
other rights as in the case of any other corporate stock.
In connection with a transfer or sale to a third party, even one
contemplated by the nature of the office, such as transfer by an executor
to a legatee, the representative is also treated as a stockholder. If he is
unable to obtain unanimous consent to the transfer, his only recourse
is to convert the shares into cash through enforcement of his right to
dissolution. Although during the period of the administration of the
estate of a deceased stockholder or during guardianship the other
stockholders are forced to accept an unwanted "partner," this is the
most practical compromise of the interests of all of the parties in such
situations.
The subsection does not specifically validate a retransfer by a
guardian or conservator to his ward upon removal of the ward's disa-
bility. However, the validity of such a transfer without the necessity
33. § 101(c) provides:
For purposes of this section, "Transfer" means all transfers of any interest in
the stock of a close corporation other than (i) a transfer by operation of law to
an executor, administrator, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, guardian, conservator,
or similar legal representative, (ii) the acquisition of a lien or power of sale
pursuant to an attachment, levy or similar procedure, and (iii) the creation or
assignment of a security interest. A foreclosure sale or other transfer by a person
who acquired his interest or power in a transaction described in the foregoing
clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) shall be a transfer subject to all the provisions of this
section, and the person effecting such foreclosure sale or other transfer shall be
treated as and have the rights of a holder of the stock under this section in con-
nection with such transfer.
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of stockholder permission would clearly fit the statutory scheme, and it
is to be hoped that a court would so interpret the section. A transfer
from an executor or guardian to a successor in office, on the other hand,
would be valid as a "transfer by operation of law" to one of the enu-
merated representatives.
As in the case of the legal representative, the sheriff or other officer
levying execution is placed in the position of a stockholder in carrying
out the execution sale. 4 Remaining stockholders are given the protec-
tion of the right to veto transfer to a successful bidder in which event
the execution may be satisfied only through dissolution or stockholder
purchase.3 5
It was considered important to preserve to the greatest extent
possible whatever value small corporation stock might have as security;
consequently transfers of a security interest were expressly permitted.
In satisfying his debt out of the stock he holds as security, however,
the security holder is placed in the position of a stockholder and may
only sell the stock or transfer it to himself with the unanimous per-
mission of the other stockholders. If such permission cannot be
obtained, he may force dissolution or purchase of the stock by the
other stockholders.
Issue or Sale of Stock by the Corporation - Section 102.
Section 102 places two limitations upon the issue or sale of stock by
the corporation itself. The first is the requirement of stockholder ap-
proval of each sale, and the second is a prohibition against the use of
certain hybrid securities.
The requirement in Subsection (a) of unanimous stockholder
approval of any sale of stock by the corporation complements the
restriction on transfer of stock as protection to existing stockholders
against the introduction of new and unwanted "partners." In addition,
it provides them with protection against changes in their proportionate
interests in control, profits, and assets.36 This simple and easily under-
stood provision was considered by the Commission to be preferable
to a statutory pre-emptive right, which would necessarily be complicated
and involve many uncertainties of interpretation. Although the ap-
proach of Section 102 (a) has the virtue of simplicity, it also has the
serious drawback of giving each stockholder a veto over new financing
34. Technically the power of sale vested in an attaching officer is not a transfer
to him, but it was thought better to avoid possible controversy by expressly affirming
its validity.
35. If the high bidder at an auction sale held by the sheriff is rejected by the other
stockholders, it is highly doubtful that the sheriff will assert the dissolution right.
It will probably be necessary for the appointment by the court of another representa-
tive to do so, such as a receiver appointed in Supplementary Proceedings under MD.
R. Civ. P. 628.
36. Cf. O'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations:
Optional Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L. Rv. 1, 41-42 (1956), in which the special
importance of protection of the stockholders of the close corporation against new issues
of stock is developed.
[VOL. XXVII
MARYLAND CLOSE CORPORATION LAW
for the corporation through the sale of its stock. In view of this and
because the only purpose of the provision is protection to the stock-
holders themselves, the section gives the stockholders power to remove
this limitation by agreement.37 The ultimate effect of Subsection (a),
then, is to force the stockholders to consider this important area of their
relationship by requiring them to take affirmative action to release the
protection which the provision affords. It should be noted that an
election to remove the requirement of stockholder approval would leave
the issuance of stock of a close corporation subject to the same pre-
emptive rights which are applicable to all corporations under Maryland
common law as qualified by Section 30 of Article 23.8 The lawyer
in planning the close corporation must give careful consideration to
both the election under Section 102 (a) and the pre-emptive right pro-
visions of Section 30.
Subsection (b) of Section 102 prohibits the close corporation's
use of "(i) any securities (including stock) which are convertible
into its stock, (ii) any voting securities other than stock and (iii) any
options, warrants or other rights to subscribe for or purchase any of
its stock which are other than nontransferable." Such securities will
seldom, if ever, be needed in the close corporation, and the possibility
of their use would add substantially to the complexity of the new
statute and to the difficulty of understanding it.
Unanimous Stockholder Vote - Section 103.
Section 103 (a) requires that all stockholders, whether or not
having a vote on other matters, must join in any action required to
be unanimous under the Close Corporation Subtitle.3" The chief actions
of this type are the elections to acquire and to relinquish close corpora-
tion status, approval of transfer of stock, and approval of the stock-
holders' agreement. All of these actions so fundamentally change the
rights and relationships of the equity owners - the partners - that the
veto power is a desirable protection. Section 103 is chiefly a house-
keeping section, expressly stating what was considered to be implicit
in the language of the various provisions to which it applies.
Stockholders' Agreements - Section 104.
The heart of the new Close Corporation Subtitle is its validation
of the stockholders' agreement under Section 104.40 The Maryland
Court of Appeals gave strong indication of the validity of such agree-
37. In contrast to the restriction on transfers of stock by stockholders, this pro-
vision is not crucial to the prevention of public trading and for this reason can
appropriately be eliminated by stockholder agreement.
38. MD. CODS ANN. art. 23, § 30 (1957).
39. In some sections the vote of additional persons, such as subscribers for stock,
is also required. E.g., § 100(a).
40. This section provides in part:
Section 104, Stockholders' Agreements - Close Corporations.(a) The stockholders of a close corporation may, by an agreement to which
all of the stockholders of the corporation have actually assented, regulate
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ments and its willingness to enforce them in DeBoy v. Harris,4 decided
in 1955. But, although there is every expectation that this case will
be extended since it is sound and highly practical, there remains the
uncertainty as to its ultimate reach which is inherent in any case
enunciating new doctrine.42 In view of this uncertainty, lawyers have
been reluctant to rely to any substantial extent on such agreements in
planning the small corporation. Section 104 (a) gives clear and
unqualified assurance that almost any aspect of the affairs of the close
corporation or the relationships of its stockholders may be regulated by
such agreements.43 The question of whether and to what extent stock-
holders' agreements should be validated by the courts in other contexts
is expressly left open under Section 104 (e) which provides that
"nothing in this section shall affect otherwise valid agreements among
stockholders of a close or other corporation." This subsection makes it
clear that a question of the validity of a stockholders' agreement in a
corporation which has not elected close corporation status or among
less than all of the stockholders of a close corporation is to be decided
upon its merits and that no implication of invalidity should be drawn
from the existence of the Close Corporation Subtitle and Section 104.
Underlying Subsection 104 (e) is the judgment that considerations
any aspect of the affairs of the corporation or the relations of the stock-
holders, including but not limited to:
(1) the management of the business and affairs of the corporation;
(2) restrictions on the transfer of stock;
(3) the right of one or more stockholders to dissolution of the cor-
poration at will or upon the occurrence of a specified event or
contingency;
(4) the exercise or division of voting power;
(5) the terms and conditions of the employment of any officer or
employee regardless of the length of the period of such em-
ployment;
(6) the persons who shall be directors and officers of the corpora-
tion; and
(7) the payment of dividends or division of profits.
41. 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955), noted in 69 HARv. L. Rzv. 565 (1956).
42. In the DeBoy case plaintiff and the two defendants had entered into an agree-
ment characterized by the court as a joint venture agreement. This agreement was
intended to regulate the parties' interests and internal relationships in connection with
proposed construction and sale or leasing of warehouses. The agreement specified that
a corporation would be formed to carry out the project, and that its stock would be
issued in such amounts as to give each party the proportionate interest in profits, assets
and control which had been agreed upon in the joint venture agreement. Three years
after formation of the corporation the defendants sought to dilute the plaintiff's in-
terest in the corporation (which by then had proved highly profitable) by the sale to
one of them of additional stock. The court held that the agreement controlled the
relationship of the parties as stockholders and fixed their respective interests in
profits and assets so that these could not be changed by the defendants' action. The
breadth of language used in the opinion and the rejection of Jackson v. Hooper, 76
N.J. Eq. 592 (1910), which had stood for many years as a leading case invalidating
stockholders' agreements, gives every indication that the holding of DeBoy would
be extended in future cases.
43. Compare the affirmative approval of the stockholders' agreement contained in§ 104(a) to the negative approach taken in the North Carolina statute which pro-
vides that ". . . no written agreement to which all of the shareholders have actually
assented ... shall be invalid as between the parties thereto, on the ground that it is an
attempt by the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or
to arrange their relationship in a manner that would be appropriate only between
parties." N.C. GzN. STrAT. §§ 55-73 (1955). Substantially the same approach is found
in S.C. Cone ArNm. §§ 12-16.22 (1962).
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pertinent to the extension of the DeBoy case and the validity of stock-
holders' agreements in these other contexts can be developed more
effectively by the courts on a case by case basis than by statute. The
importance of Section 104 (e) for the continued flexibility and growth
of the law in this area cannot be over-emphasized.
The validation of the stockholders' agreement makes possible the
tailoring of the corporate structure to fit exactly the needs and desires
of the owners of the business. Recognition is thus given to a basic
characteristic of the incorporated partnership - that the rights and
interests of the parties are the highly individualized product of negotia-
tion and agreement among the "partners" and seldom fit comfortably
into the standard corporate pattern. Also implicit in the approval of
contractual variation of the normal corporate procedures is the premise
that these procedures are not an end in themselves and that the owners
of the business should be allowed to regulate their affairs in any man-
ner they see fit unless a good reason appears to the contrary.44 The
areas of activity subject to regulation by the stockholders' agreement
which are enumerated in Section 104 (a) are not exclusive, but are
examples of the type of activity which may be regulated.
An important provision of Section 104 (a) is the express valida-
tion under Subsection (6) of the allocation of corporate offices and
positions on the board of directors among the "partners" by stock-
holders' agreement. Such an allocation is often an integral part of the
parties' basic bargain, especially when it represents a means of allocating
control and distributing profits. An interesting question is raised as
to whether a stockholder to whom a specific corporate office or a posi-
tion on the board has been allocated by such an agreement may be
removed without cause by vote of the other stockholders or directors
under Sections 52 (d) and 61 of Article 23." It is suggested that to
allow majority stockholders to welch on their bargain in this way
would clearly run counter to the policy expressed in Section 104.
Sections 52 (d) and 61 represent protection for the stockholders from
abuses by a representative government. While this is sound in the case
of the publicly held corporation, there is little necessity for it in the case
44. For a particularly persuasive statement of this position, see Latty, The Close
Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. R~v.
432-37 (1956) ; for other arguments in the same vein, see Bradley, Toward a More
Perfect Close Corporation - The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 Gto.
L.J. 1145, 1148-49 (1966) ; Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held
Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1041 (1950) ; Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treat-
ment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 700, 712-13 (1958). The internal
procedures under which corporate decisions are made and the regulation of such
internal matters as the relationships among stockholders have no substantial effect
on the rights of third parties or their relationships to the corporation. Historically
the board of directors was not an original or fundamental part of the corporate
concept. In England there was no statutory requirement of a board of directors prior
to the enactment of the Companies Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 139. In
addition, until the decision in Automatic Self-Cleaning Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuning-
hame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34 (C.A.), the directors were generally considered simply the
agents of the stockholders and completely subject to their control. See, e.g., Isle of
Wight Ry. v. Tahourdin*, [1883] 25 Ch. D. 320 (C.A.). In the United States several
of the early state business corporation statutes contained no requirement of a board
of directors. E. M. DODD, AMERICAN BusINEss CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, 100 (1954).
45. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 23, §§ 52(d), 61 (1957).
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of the close corporation, particularly when such protection would be
achieved at the cost of undermining the integrity of a governing stock-
holders' agreement.
In expressly validating long-term employment contracts for officers
under Section 104 (a) (5), the statute removes any doubts concerning
the validity of such contracts which may linger at common law. Al-
though the question of the power of the board of directors to make
long-term employment contracts has not been raised in Maryland, a
group of older cases in other jurisdictions have invalidated employment
contracts of corporate officers on the grounds of excessive length or that
the term of the employment exceeded the term of office of the board
of directors.40 Because one of the most important benefits of invest-
ment in the small corporation is the right to employment in the busi-
ness, it is crucial for the parties to be able to establish employment
rights at the outset and to know that the bargain may be depended upon.
Section 104 (b) requires unanimous stockholder consent to any
amendment of the stockholders' agreement and precludes provision in
the agreement itself permitting amendment by less than unanimity.
The purpose of this provision is to afford protection to the minority
stockholder against any change in the agreement which he has nego-
tiated and upon the basis of which he has invested. There is much to be
said, however, for leaving the decision as to whether this protection
is needed to the stockholders themselves by allowing the stockholders'
agreement to specify amendment by less than unanimous action. Since
the agreement itself must have unanimous approval, each stockholder
would have the opportunity to consider the acceptability of such a pro-
vision at the outset and to veto it if he found it undesirable. The posi-
tion adopted in the statute is based upon a fear of abuse especially
in cases involving small businessmen who may not fully realize the
implications of the provision to which they are consenting.
Section 104 (c) deals with the problem of persons acquiring stock
subsequent to the execution of a stockholders' agreement. Such a stock-
holder is made a party to the agreement if he has actual knowledge of
its existence at the time of acquiring his stock. The term "actual
knowledge" is intended to preclude ascribing constructive notice of
the agreement to the purchaser on the basis of reference to the agree-
ment in the charter or on the stock certificate. Actual knowledge is not,
however, required in the case of a stockholder acquiring his stock
by a gift or bequest from a party to the agreement. As a party, the
new stockholder is not only subject to the restrictions of the agreement,
but may enforce its provisions against other stockholder-parties. In
other words, he becomes a full "partner" under the "partnership
agreement."4 7
46. E.g., Borland v. J. F. Sass Printing Co., 95 Colo. 53, 32 P.2d 827 (1934);
Clifford v. Fireman's Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, 232 App. Div. 260, 249 N.Y. 713 (per
curiam), aff'd mer., 259 N.Y. 547, 182 N.E. 175 (1932); Biers v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 66 Hun. 75, 20 N.Y.S. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1892) ; Edwards v. Keller, 133 S.W.2d
823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (subsequently changed by statute). Tnx. Bus. CoRP. Aci'.
§ 2.02A(12) (1956).
47. Any prospective purchaser of stock in a close corporation in which there is an
outstanding stockholders' agreement, should carefully review its provisions and, when
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One of the most difficult problems in connection with the stock-
holders' agreement is the treatment to be accorded the purchaser
of stock who has no knowledge of a prior stockholders' agreement.
As a practical matter, the situation is likely to occur infrequently.4
Although small businesses are regularly bought and sold, such sales
most often involve the entire business rather than the sale of a
single "partner's" interest to an outsider. Because of the normal
caution involved in buying into the small business operated essentially
on a partnership basis, reasonably careful investigation by the purchaser
can be expected in most cases. In addition, the stockholders who are
remaining in the business and who must approve the transfer have
strong incentive to insure that the newcomer knows of any provisions
of a stockholders' agreement which will affect his relationship with
them. When a lawyer is involved, it is highly unlikely that the existence
of an agreement will not be ascertained and the parties made aware
of it. Even where a purchase without knowledge occurs, failure to
disclose such critical information as the existence of a stockholders'
agreement would be likely to constitute fraud or misrepresentation suf-
ficient to support an action for rescission of the sale if the seller is
available and financially responsible, thereby providing a way out of the
difficulty. In spite of these considerations, however, cases of this
kind may occasionally arise. In such situations, the provisions of the
agreement, while still enforceable by the parties against each other,
would not be enforceable against the new stockholder. At the same
time, the newcomer would have no right to enforce any of the pro-
visions of the agreement without becoming party to it. Since this situa-
tion is unsatisfactory to everyone concerned, it places considerable
pressure on the existing shareholders to make certain that prospective
purchasers have knowledge of any existing stockholders' agreement and
on purchasers to inquire as to the existence of an agreement.
Section 104 (d) provides that a stockholders' agreement may
"be enforced by injunction or such other relief as the court may de-
termine to be fair and appropriate in the circumstances." 49 This pro-
vision establishes no power which an equity court does not already have.
The express reference to the power of specific enforcement is included
solely for the purpose of insuring that the courts entertain no doubts
as to their broad powers under the new statute.
Section 104 (d) further provides that, "As an alternative to the
granting of an injunction or other equitable relief, the court may, upon
the motion of a party to the proceeding, order dissolution of the cor-
poration under the provisions of Section 109 (b) and (c) of this
appropriate, negotiate a new agreement with the remaining stockholders before making
the purchase, since purchase of the stock would be likely not to constitute purchase
of the prior stockholders' contractual rights under the stockholders' agreement absent
agreement to this effect by the other stockholders.
48. While this statement is true in the case of the close or other small corpora-
tion, it is clearly not applicable to the case of the corporation in which the stock is
traded with any degree of frequency and in which there is no close personal relation-
ship among the stockholders.
49. Under Maryland procedure, the term "injunction" includes court orders
requiring affirmative action, as well as those prohibiting specified conduct. MD. R.
Civ. P. BB70a.
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Article." Dissolution should be granted under this provision at the dis-
cretion of the court, when it appears that termination of the relation-
ship will be in the best interests of all of the stockholders.50 The rea-
sonably amicable personal relationship necessary in most cases to the
success of a small business will almost invariably be destroyed when
the parties have been through a court action, and dissolution may be
the best solution from the standpoint of all parties, including the one
who emerges the winner of the judicial proceeding. Strict enforcement
of specific terms of the governing agreement may, due to rupture of
the personal relations or to other changed circumstances, secure short-
run advantage for the winner in the proceeding without providing
him the real substance of his bargain. 1
Board of Directors - Sections 105 and 106.
Section 106 permits the owners of a close corporation to reduce the
number of directors below the normal minimum of three, and Section
105 permits the elimination of the board of directors altogether. Elec-
tion under one of these sections will be especially appropriate in situa-
tions in which all of the stockholders would also be directors or in which
there are only one or two stockholders and dummy directors would
normally be necessary.2 These sections are based upon the premise
that representative government may be neither necessary nor useful
in a corporation with few stockholders and that the decision as to
whether this is true for the particular corporation is best left to its
owners.
53
If elimination of the board of directors is elected under Section
105, all actions which would have been taken by director vote will be
taken by the voting of shares in accordance with normal procedure for
stockholder action, at a meeting or otherwise.
The provision of Section 105 (b) that the elimination of directors
will become effective only after there has been an issuance of stock is
cumbersome, but is required by the practical necessity of designating
someone who can carry out the first stock issuance. Without it, the
50. This is to be contrasted with the standard for dissolution under § 109(a).Although most cases in which dissolution is appropriate under § 104(d) will be casesin which ". . . there is such internal dissention that the business and affairs of the
corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the stockholders gen-
erally," this may not always be true.
51. For the development of substantially the same idea, see Chayes, Madame
Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARV. L. ,zv. 1532 (1960).52. Not only are dummy directors an inconvenience but, especially in corporations
having more than one owner, the persons serving in such capacity may find that theyhave incurred fiduciary responsibilities which cannot be easily reconciled with theirloyalties to the party at whose request they are serving. In the extreme case they
may even incur liability for accommodation votes or inattention to the business. Seegenerally, Note, Use of Accommodation Incorporators, Directors, Officers: Potential
Liability of Accommodation Personnel, 47 CORNXLL L.Q. 443 (1962).
53. This premise is advanced in almost every comment upon the necessity of
special treatment for the close corporation. See, e.g., F.H. O'NEAL, CLOS4 CORPORA-
TIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.60 (1958); Kesseler, The Statutory Requirement
of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CI. L. Rzv. 696 (1960) ;Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act,34 N.C.L. Rzv. 432 (1956) ; Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation" Law,
28 CORNXLL L.Q. 313, 321 (1943).
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elimination of the directors would leave no one available to issue the
initial stock. The only alternative to the procedure specified in Section
105 (b) would have been to delegate this task to the incorporators or
possibly to subscribers. Whichever alternative were utilized, some
safeguards against improper or unfair conduct on the part of those
issuing the stock would be necessary. Unlike incorporators who have
no fiduciary position under Maryland law, or subscribers whose fidu-
ciary position, if any, is uncertain, directors' fiduciary responsibilities
are well established and understood. Utilization of this ready-made rela-
tionship was preferable to an attempt to create a wholly new set of
fiduciary duties for this limited purpose.
Section 105 is careful not to specify that the common law fiduciary
responsibilities of directors are to be shifted to stockholders when the
election has been made to eliminate the board. There is good reason
for this. The fiduciary responsibilities of directors were developed at
common law as a protection for the owners of the corporation against
the abuse of delegated power by persons acting in a representative
capacity. The stockholders of a close corporation having no board of
directors are not representatives acting for someone else, but rather
are the owners of the business acting in their own interests in exactly
the same manner in which the stockholders of other corporations are
acting for themselves in voting upon any question to come before a
stockholders' meeting. Although the fiduciary responsibilities of di-
rectors and officers are highly developed under present law, the fiduciary
limits, if any, on the exercise of controlling power by stockholders are
still in the embryonic stage. The relatively few cases which have dealt
with this responsibility have provided little useful guidance as to how
far it extends. 54 It may well prove, of course, that the special nature
of the relationship among stockholders operating a close corporation
without directors dictates extension of the present fiduciary responsi-
bilities of controlling stockholders in these situations. If so, this ex-
tension should come from the courts rather than the legislature, since
the common law process is particularly well suited to the development
of such fiduciary responsibilities. Section 105 omits any provision
regarding the fiduciary position of stockholders when there are no
directors in order to leave this question to the courts for development
on a case by case basis."
54. On the question of limitation on sale of controlling shares, see Perlman v.
Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). The confusion which has been caused by this
case is evidenced in the commentaries which followed it. See, e.g., Hill, The State of
Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. Rsv. 986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in Corporate
Control, 44 CA~i. L. Rtv. 1 (1956) ; Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104
U. PA. L. Rxv. 715 (1956). Other leading cases on various aspects of the fiduciary
duties of stockholders to each other include Zahn v. Transamenica Corp., 162 F.2d 36(3d Cir. 1947); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 675 (1942); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Gb. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
55. The new Delaware Close Corporation Law, in contrast, imposes "all liabilities
of directors" upon stockholders of a close corporation having no board of directors.
DL. G~N. CORP. LAW § 351(1) (2 P-H COaPORTION 1967). The Florida Close
Corporation Law, on the other hand, imposes upon such stockholders the liabilities
imposed upon directors by the general corporation statute. FLA. SrAT. § 608.0102(2)(1963). Presumably this provision leaves open the question of the imposition upon
stockholders of common law directors' duties.
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Section 105 (c) (1) imposes liability upon stockholders voting
for illegal dividends, redemptions of stock and distribution of assets
on liquidation, or for loans to officers of the corporation. The fact
that these prohibitions are also imposed upon directors by Section 6256
does not indicate a legislative intention that directors and stockholders
should in other situations be treated in the same manner. The legislative
determination is simply that in the enumerated situations the proscribed
activity should be discouraged regardless of who is taking the action.
The reference to Section 62 is a drafting convenience and has no sig-
nificance as an indication of similarity between directors and stock-
holders for purposes of determining the fiduciary responsibilities of
the stockholders to each other.
Annual Meeting of Stockholders - Section 107.
The present statutory requirement that an annual meeting of
stockholders actually be held each year is eliminated for the close cor-
poration by Section 107. This elimination of a requirement which is
normally considered a stockholder safeguard is warranted by the close
connection with the business and greater awareness of its affairs which
is typical of stockholders of the close corporation. A sufficient safe-
guard is retained in that the section gives any stockholder the right to
require in a particular year that the annual meeting be held at the time
specified in the by-laws.
Inspection of Books and Records - Section 108.
Under Section 108, any stockholder of a close corporation is
entitled to inspect and copy all books and records of the corporation.
The limitations upon the right of inspection contained in Section 515'
and similar provisions in the statutes of other states are appropriate
as protective measures for the large corporation against harassment
and unduly burdensome demands of stockholders, but for the corpora-
tion with few stockholders and relatively simple books such protection is
unnecessary. 58
Judicial Dissolution Upon Petition of a Stockholder
Section 109.
Judicial dissolution at the discretion of the court is available to
the stockholders of all corporations (including close corporations) when
the conditions of Section 79A of Article 23 are met.59 Under Section
56. MD. COD ANN. art. 23, § 62 (1966 repl. vol.).
57. MD. Cong ANN. art. 23, § 51 (1966 repl. vol.).
58. For a general discussion of the need for a broad right of inspection of cor-porate books and records in the close corporation, see O'Neal, Molding the CorporateForm to Particular Business Situations: Optional Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L. Rxv.
1, 40-41 (1956).
59. Mn. COng ANN. art. 23, § 79A (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1967). This
section is new, having been passed as a part of the general revision of the corporationlaw by the General Assembly in 1967; § 79A replaced § 52(e) of art. 23 whichformerly controlled judicial dissolution and which was repealed as a part of the revision.
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79A (a), holders of twenty-five percent of the voting stock of the cor-
poration may petition for dissolution if action by the board of directors
is impossible due to director deadlock or if election of directors is pre-
vented by stockholder deadlock. Under Section 79A(b), the holder
of any stock entitled to a vote upon the election of directors may petition
for dissolution if the stockholders because of deadlock have failed to
elect directors for two successive annual meeting dates or if there have
been illegal, oppressive or fraudulent acts by the directors or "those in
control of the corporation."
In addition to his rights under Section 79A, the stockholder of a
close corporation is given the option of seeking dissolution under the
broader provisions of Section 109. This section provides that dis-
solution may be ordered at the discretion of the court when "there is
such internal dissension among the stockholders of the corporation
that (its) . .. business and affairs . . . can no longer be conducted to
the advantage of the stockholders generally." Dissolution is made more
readily available to the close corporation by Section 109 on the ground
that the close personal relationship and lack of a market for the stock
make dissolution an important safety valve for the stockholders of
such corporations. The standard under which a Section 109 dissolution
is to be granted is deliberately broad in order to allow the courts the
widest possible latitude in reaching fair and sensible results in a wide
variety of cases. The question of whether dissolution should be made
available in a given case is essentially a question of balancing the inter-
ests of the parties and the equities in light of the facts of the particular
situation. No attempt to lay down a detailed statutory formula describ-
ing the circumstances under which dissolution would be appropriate
for a close corporation could hope to be successful. Of course, it should
be borne in mind that certain considerations will recur in many of the
cases. For example, it should be recognized that in almost every case
some stockholders will suffer disproportionately in the event of liqui-
dation." Relative fault in creating or prolonging discord would also
seem an appropriate consideration. A court might well, for example,
consider whether either side has made an offer to purchase the stock
of the other, to sell its own stock, or has rejected an offer to buy or
sell by the other side."'
Of major importance under Section 109 is the newly established
right of the stockholders of a close corporation wishing to continue the
business to avoid dissolution by electing to purchase the interest of
any stockholder petitioning for dissolution. 2 This provision applies to
any judicial dissolution of a close corporation whether pursuant to Sec-
60. This will often occur, for example, when there is an inactive partner who
could not operate the business alone because of lack of training and experience, com-
mitment of his time elsewhere, or for some other reason. See, e.g., In re Radom
& Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
61. The broad discretionary power granted the court by § 109 would also
make available the technique of issuing a decree ordering dissolution to be effective
on a specified date unless an offer had been made by a stockholder to purchase the
petitioner's stock at a stated price prior to that date.
62. Similar provisions appear in CONN. GEN. STAT. Rv. §§ 33-117 (1958);
CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 4658 (West 1955); W. VA. CODs ANN. § 31-1-80 (1966).
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tion 109 or Section 79A. It results in a fair accommodation of the
conflicting interests involved, on the one hand the desire to continue a
profitable enterprise, and on the other, a desire to secure reasonable
value for one's ownership interest.
It seems likely that in the great majority of cases a purchase of the
interest of the liquidating stockholder will be negotiated among the in-
terested parties on an informal basis. The formal procedure established
by Section 109(c) and its cost serves as a practical pressure to pro-
duce informal negotiation as well as an alternative procedure should
such negotiation break down. In the event that it becomes necessary
for a determination of the value of the stock to be made by the court,
the new section incorporates the already established procedure for
determining the value of stock in the case of a stockholder's assertion
of his appraisal remedy under Section 73.63 Under this procedure, a
determination of the value of the stock is made by three court-appointed
appraisers. The report of the appraisers is submitted to the court and
to the parties, who may file objections to it and request a hearing if
they desire. The court may then approve or modify the determination
of the appraisers or reject it and order a new determination to be made.
Section 109 (c) adds to the Section 73 procedure broad power in the
court to direct the conditions of sale, including the power to order
payment to be made in installments where appropriate. The provision
for equal division of the costs of the appraisal proceeding between selling
and purchasing stockholders is designed to place pressure on both sides
to negotiate the sale out of court.
Stockholders asserting their right to bar dissolution by the purchase
of the stock of a stockholder petitioning for dissolution are required
to give bond or sufficient security to insure their ability to pay a
reasonable price for the stock. This serves both as a protection to the
stockholder seeking dissolution and as a deterrent to harassing or
delaying tactics.
There is a danger that stockholders who in fact wish to continue
to operate the business might permit dissolution and liquidation of the
company in order to buy the assets at a lower figure than it would be
necessary for them to pay if they elected to purchase the stock of the
shareholder seeking dissolution. Since this would circumvent the stat-
ute's purpose of providing the stockholder a reasonable alternative when
transfer of his stock is barred, it is to be hoped that the courts will
not approve liquidation sales to other stockholders over the objection
of the liquidating stockholder when such sales make it possible for the
remaining stockholders to continue the business.
In the event a petition for dissolution has been filed and more
than one of the remaining stockholders seeks to purchase the petitioner's
stock, the statute expressly leaves the apportionment of the stock
among the purchasing stockholders to the discretion of the court. In
such a situation, disposition of the stock among the purchasers should
generally be made in such a way as to leave the purchasing stockholders
63. MD. COD ANN. art. 23, § 73 (1966 repl. vol.).
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as nearly as possible with the same interests and powers relative to
each other as they had prior to the sale.
Unanimous Stockholder Approval of Mergers, etc.
Section 110.
Section 110 provides:
In the case of any consolidation or merger of a close corpora-
tion or the sale, lease, exchange or other transfer of all or sub-
stantially all of its property and assets pursuant to the provisions
of Section 66 of this Article, approval of the proposed articles
under Section 66 (d) shall require the affirmative vote of the
holders of all outstanding stock of the corporation.6 4
This provision is designed to prevent the negation of close cor-
poration status or an outstanding stockholders' agreement by the use
of the device of a merger or sale of assets. It is also consistent with
the general policy of requiring unanimity in the case of basic decisions
affecting the close corporation.
AN APPRAISAL
For a good many years writers have strenuously urged special
statutory treatment for the close corporation. In many instances the
claims made as to the benefits to be derived from such statutes have
been exaggerated. Brief reflection upon the new Maryland statute will
indicate that it is by no means a panacea for all the ills of the small
business. Its achievements are the simplification of somewhat burden-
some formalities and the better adaptation of the corporate form to the
needs of the "incorporated partnership." Lawyers and businessmen
for years have lived with such requirements as a board of directors and
an annual meeting and could continue to do so if necessary. True, many
businessmen have probably fervently agreed with Mr. Bumble that "the
law is a ass" when, as sole owners of a small corporation, they have
been required to have a three-man board of directors, but they have
survived the experience. On the other hand, the pruning away of un-
necessary formalities is a constant necessity if the law is to be responsive
to the needs of the business community and to maintain some vestige
of respect from businessmen. Such other provisions as those making
dissolution more readily available and those granting full stockholder
access to corporate records represent a better accommodation of the
interests of the parties under the special circumstances of the small
business.
The most significant accomplishment of the new Subtitle, however,
is the clear assurance which it gives to lawyers and their clients of the
validity of the stockholders' agreement as a method of regulating the
affairs of the small corporation and the relations of its stockholders.
64. MD. CODZ ANN. art. 23, § 66(d) (1966 repl. vol.), requires approval of the
proposed articles of merger or of sale, lease, exchange or transfer by two-thirds
stockholder vote in corporations other than a close corporation.
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Under previous law, the corporate specialist could accomplish most
client objectives, however demanding. This often required complex and
cumbersome arrangements, but in the end the client's needs were satis-
fied. For this lawyer, the stockholders' agreement represents only a
more simple and direct vehicle for accomplishing his ends. For the
lawyer who is not a corporate expert, however, the stockholders' agree-
ment may serve a more important function. Such lawyers are not
usually versed in the highly sophisticated maneuvers needed to accom-
plish a client's special needs, and, for them, the direct contractual
approach may be the means of achieving client objectives which would
otherwise have to be abandoned. When it is remembered that most of
the legal work for the small business is done not by the corporate
expert, but by the general practitioner, this point takes on special
significance.
As a less direct but nonetheless important benefit, it is to be hoped
that the new statute will make both courts and lawyers more conscious
of the significant differences between the publicly held and the "partner-
ship" corporation and that this will be reflected in more responsive
judicial decisions and more workable private arrangements.
